Cuban Missile crisis and Cold War intelligence Term Paper

Cuban Missile crisis and Cold state of war intelligence - Term Paper ExampleThe hallmark of the Cold War was that though confrontations occurred between these 2 super powers in different parts of the world in their attempts to enhance their spheres of influence, they neer came into direct difference with each either. Instead proxies took up the cudgels for the two competing super powers in these conflicts. This characteristic of the Cold War was solid for humanity, as both possessed nuclear weapons in enough quantities to destroy each another(prenominal) and the balance of the world. However, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 brought these two super powers close to direct conflict with each other and the possibility of nuclear destruction. The world watched with bated breath as the moves and counter moves went on for six days. The American ground forces were readied for the invasion of Cuba and the nuclear might of America was al set for delivery onto the Soviet. The order for these actions never came, as in the eleventh hour the Russian Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev decided use the excerpt for defusing the tension provided by President Kennedy of pulling out the troublesome missiles from Cuba in exchange for non-invasion of Cuba promise by the U.S.A (Divine, 1988). Background. In April 1961 a Cuban exile force armed and sponsored by U.S.A was sent into Cuba to clear up Fidel Castro and the threat of communism on the door steps of U.S.A. The result was a disastrous defeat of the Cuban exile force at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. Almost a year later the self-denial minister of Cuba and younger brother of Fidel Castro paid a visit to the Soviet amount. The result of this visit was the jaunt of Soviet Union military personnel and weapons to Cuba on the plea that Fidel Castro required the support of the Soviet Union to defend Cuba against any invasion of Cuba by U.S.A. (Garthoff, 1989). Republican protests on the large military build up in Cuba started in the U.S.A., which became even more strident, when photographs taken by a U-2 plane overflying Cuba, revealed ongoing turn work for a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site, which was taken to be defensive posture by the Kennedy administration. The CIA percept of this was that it could be the prelude to the more ominous introduction of SAMs with offensive potential. Though the Soviet Union continued to deny any offensive posturing, Republican pressure on the Kennedy administration for a response began to mount. Subsequent CIA U-2 provided even more disquieting news of the Soviet Union building initiation sites for their medium-range ballistic missiles and long-range ballistic missiles (Divine, 1988). America needed to respond now. Two options of response were studied. The first touch the use of the American Air Force to bomb the missile sites. The second was a blockade of Cuba by the American Navy to prevent the transportation of any missiles to Cuba. The second option became the chos en response, for it provided the benefit of backward escalation. The Soviet response was to challenge the blockade. However, better sense prevailed and there was no attempt to break the blockade. Instead, the Russians concur to withdraw the offending missiles, stop the missile site build-up, and withdraw the Russian bombers capable of delivering nuclear bombs that were stationed in Cuba. In response U.S.A. declared that it would not invade Cuba (Divine, 1988). Cold War Intelligence Evaluation of the American intelligence activities from the start of the Cold